Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and The Crisis with China by Cabestan, Jean-Pierre
 China Perspectives 
2010/2 | 2010
Gao Xingjian and the Role of Chinese Literature Today
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-
Taiwan Relations and The Crisis with China
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5293
ISSN : 1996-4617
Éditeur
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 juin 2010
ISSN : 2070-3449
 
Référence électronique
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, « Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and The
Crisis with China », China Perspectives [En ligne], 2010/2 | 2010, mis en ligne le 05 août 2010, consulté
le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5293 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 28 octobre 2019.
© All rights reserved
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk:
United States-Taiwan Relations and
The Crisis with China
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
1 Nancy  Bernkopf  Tucker,  Strait  Talk:  United  States-Taiwan
Relations and The Crisis with China, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 2009, xiv, 390 pp.
2 This  is  a  weighty  addition  to  the  collection  of  books  dealing  with
Washington-Taipei ties as well as relations across the Taiwan Strait. Not
because of its size, though: its 280 pages of text, albeit dense, make for
an agreeable read. With more than 50 pages of notes and an extensive
bibliography,  Nancy  Tucker’s  work  makes  a  decisive  contribution  to
understanding the complex and often conﬂicting relations between the
United States and Taiwan since1971, when Nixon and Kissinger decided
to  “sacriﬁce”  Taiwan  on  the  altar  of  rapprochement  and  gradual
normalisationwith the People’s Republic of China. It also facilitates a
better  appreciation  of  the  no  less  complex  interaction  between  this
persisting  resentment  on  the  one  hand  and  Washington-Beijing  and
Taipei-Beijing relations on the other – in short, the factors governing
and aﬀecting the triangle in question.
3 Focusing on crucial moments that have marked the last 40 years
of US-Taiwan relations, the book complements the luminous analysis by
Richard  Bush  (At  Cross  Purposes,  Armonk,  New York,  M.E.  Sharpe,
2004), who had both the advantage and the drawback of being one of
the key actors during this  period (or  at  least  the last  two decades).
While Tucker is personally acquainted with and interviewed nearly all
of  the Americans and Taiwanese who played a  role  in  this  veritable
diplomatic-strategic “saga,” she has maintained a certain distance from
the subject, thereby strengthening her argument. 
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4 What  is  Tucker's  thesis?  At  ﬁrst  glance  it  seems  simple:  the
interests defended and priority objectives pursued by Washington and
Taipei  have  most  often  been  diﬀerent  and  sometimes  openly
contradictory, leading to much friction. Other authors have dealt with
this reality, but Tucker’s book explains it much more completely and is
well documented, which makes it particularly nuanced and convincing.
5 First  of  all,  Tucker  reminds  and  persuades  us  that  history  is
written by men and women in situations in which they can make choices
and  take decisions.  Nothing  was  predetermined  in  the  Washington-
Taipei-Beijing triangle. For instance, Kissinger’s notorious capitulation
in the face of Zhou Enlai’s craftiness on Taiwan in 1971 (pp. 41-43) was
one man’s doing rather than that of the administration, which at that
time still oﬀicially favoured the two-China policy vigorously defended by
George  H.W.  Bush  as  US  permanent  representative  to  the  United
Nations…
6 Tucker  then  shows  how Taiwan’s  democratisation  altered  the
nature of the triangle, just as the world emerged from the Cold War:
long underestimated by the American establishment, this fundamental
change obliged the United States to begin treating China and Taiwan on
terms  of  formal  equality:  henceforth  no  decision  on  Taiwan’s  future
could be taken without assent from the majority of Taiwanese, as Bill
Clinton had to ﬁnally concede in 2000, four days after Beijing published
a white paper pointedly threatening Taiwan (p. 249).
7 What is most striking, however, is the multiplicity of forces in the
United States seeking to inﬂuence this relationship (which is known)
and the resulting hesitation (less well known) at the top of the ruling
establishment:  defence  circles,  diplomats,  business  lobbies,  and  of
course Congress. If Taiwan has long taken advantage of this situation,
resorting to a public relations ﬁrm to facilitate Lee Teng-hui’s visit to
Cornell  University  in  1995,  for  instance,  China  has  also  learned  to
activate  lobbying  that  could  well  lead  to  weakening  US  security
commitments with regard to Taiwan in the long run. 
8 Tucker notes that these commitments remain strong and cannot
be easily changed, as that could call into question the US presence and
role in the Asia-Paciﬁc region as a whole. She points out clearly to what
extent  Washington’s  application of  the third Sino-US communiqué of
August 1982, endorsing agradual reduction of American arms sales to
Taiwan, remains linked to the demilitarisation of the Taiwan Strait and
Beijing's adoption of  an exclusively peaceful  reuniﬁcation policy.  Her
detailed  analysis  of  the  build-up  to  the  1995-1996  missile  crisis  is
illuminating in this regard. 
9 Given all this, it might be pertinent to ask whether the global
war against terrorism might not have greatly eclipsed the continuing
risks,  despite  the  current  détente,  posed  by  the  cross-strait
confrontation, which might well be the only conﬂict with the potential
to  provoke  a  nuclear  confrontation  between  the  United  States  and
China.  That is  why,  as Tucker demonstrates repeatedly,  any show of
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weakness or even a diplomatic “mini-withdrawal” by Washington on the
Taiwan  issue  leads  to  Beijing  pushing  its  advantage  as  well  as  to
increased risk. Such was the case, for instance, with the conﬁdential
letter setting out the US “three nos” policy (no Taiwan independence,
no  one-China-one-Taiwan,  and  no  Taiwan  entry  into  any  inter-state
international organisations) that Clinton sent to Jiang Zemin in August
1995 to reassure him of American intentions: instead of calming the
waters, this written assurance emboldened Jiang to move ahead with
even more threatening and dangerous missile launches in March 1996.
As we know, this obliged the United States to send two aircraft carrier
ﬂeets to the Strait area to ensure that Taiwan’s presidential elections
could take place smoothly (pp. 217-218).  
10 Clearly,  Washington-Taipei  ties  have  always  been  complicated
and, moreover, subservient to US national interests, including the need
to maintain a stable relationship with Beijing. As is well known, Chen
Shui-bian  got  a  taste  of  this  by  managing  to  alienate  the  Bush  II
administration,  a  feat  worthy  of  mention  in  a  Guinness  book  of
diplomatic records. More generally, the Americans want the Taiwanese
to  take their  defence needs  seriously  but  at  the same time want  to
remain  fully  in  control  of  operations in  the  event  of  a  cross-Strait
conﬂict.  However,  as the gap with the People’s  Liberation Army has
widened,  Taipei  has  balked  at  investing  too much  in  its  security,
preferring to pursue contacts with Beijing so as to contain crises and
avoid war. Developments the book deals with regarding secret contacts
made by Lee Teng-hui as well  as Chen Shui-bian in times of tension
(over the missile  crisis  and the two-state theory in 1999 and 2002),
often  behind  American  backs,  reveal  the  level  of  trust  between
Washington  and  Taipei.  Witness  the  weird  tango  in  which  they  ﬁnd
themselves now, with the Americans oﬀering a security umbrella that
some in the Kuomintang think Taiwan no longer needs.
11 This points to a caveat: rather than mistrust, it is quite simply
divergent  interests  that  explain  the  “dysfunction”  in  the  relations
between the United States, Taiwan, and China. Certainly, Tucker's call
for higher-level communication between Washington and Taipei could
help,  but  better  communication (or  in  her  words,  strait  talk)  cannot
“move  mountains,”  especially  as  the  Chinese  mountain  is  growing,
Taiwan's is diminishing,  and the US mountain has a good chance of
projecting its shadow for a long time yet over the Taiwan Strait. Above
all,  the current Taipei-Beijing détente can hardly overcome the basic
factor  that  the author has vividly  exposed:  Taiwan is  a  state largely
dependent  on  the  United  States  for  survival.  If  Taiwan,  as  a  state,
defends its national interests, it cannot let ties with its sole protector
loosen too much.
12 Which is why Tucker’s conclusion is inescapable: given the US
contribution to Taiwan’s security and to cross-Strait peace, it is diﬀicult
to  conceive  of  Washington  being  excluded  from  any  Beijing-Taipei
negotiations on their future relations.  
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13 Translated by N. Jayaram
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